Speaker: Prof. Zenan Wu (School of Economics, Peking University)

Title: Decentralized Contest Design in Networks

Date: Wednesday, May 6, 2026
Time: 4:30 PM - 5:50 PM

Venue: 90402 International Hall

Abstract

Heterogeneous players are matched into interconnected pairwise contests across multiple battlefields. Each organizer independently sets her contest rules to maximize effort provision on her respective battlefield. The conventional wisdom of leveling the playing field may fail in this environment. However, an even odds equilibrium always exists, in which all contests are resolved with equal winning probabilities. Further, we identify sufficient conditions—concerning contest technologies and network structure—that mitigate network externalities and restore the level-playing-field principle, such that each organizer prefers a fully balanced contest regardless of others’ choices. We provide alternative sufficient conditions under which the even-odds equilibrium remains unique, even when an organizer does not necessarily prefer a fully balanced contest.