Title: Interlocking Directors and Technology Exclusion

Speaker: Prof. Hojun Seo(Mitch Daniels School of Business, Purdue University)

Date: Friday, June 5, 2026

Time: 4:30 PM - 5:50 PM

Venue: 90402 International Hall

Abstract

We investigate whether interlocking directorates influence technology licensing and the exclusion of peer firms from accessing essential technologies. We find that firms connected through interlocking directors are more likely to enter into licensing agreements and that, following these interlock-driven agreements, licensors reduce further licensing to industry peers of the licensees. Consistent with this exclusion, affected peers experience a decline in the value of their subsequent patents compared to unaffected peers. These effects are more pronounced when licensors’ technologies are less easily substitutable and when excluded peers are more financially constrained and more dependent on the licensors’ technologies. In response, these peers shift their innovation trajectories by citing licensors’ patents less often and relying more on internal knowledge. Additionally, we find that peer firms delay their patent disclosures. We also find that interlock-driven licensing agreements are structured to promote exclusivity and long-term collaboration.