We study how disclosure accessibility affects information choice in a model with two investors who differ in their processing capacity. The unsophisticated investor can only process the public disclosure. The sophisticated investor can process it more accurately or acquire private information. Greater accessibility helps both investors understand the disclosure, but it can also reduce the sophisticated investor’s information advantage. This loss can outweigh the benefit of greater precision and induce him to switch to private information acquisition. Around this switch, the earnings response coefficient (ERC) falls while prices become more informative because the two investors trade on signals with independent noise. We also consider a dynamic model in which the sophisticated investor can trade on private information before the earnings announcement. Trading before the unsophisticated investor raises the profit from private information acquisition and strengthens the incentive to switch. More information then enters prices before the announcement. We find supporting evidence around EDGAR implementation: pre-announcement returns become more closely associated with subsequent earnings surprises, while trading volume and analyst forecast revisions increase.