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Huettner, Frank

Major: Decision Sciences

Assistant Professor

Frank Huettner is Associate Professor of Decision Sciences at SKK GSB, Sungkyunkwan University. He holds a Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Leipzig and previously held research positions at ESMT Berlin and HHL Leipzig. His research addresses two managerial questions: how to divide jointly created value among contributors—partners, marketing channels, or the inputs of a predictive model—and how consumers choose when evaluating products takes effort. On the first, he studies the foundations of the Shapley value, the standard tool for attribution in business analytics and for explaining machine-learning predictions. His current work examines how coalitions can manipulate the Shapley value and its extensions to games with externalities. On the second, his article in Operations Research shows how differences in how costly products are to evaluate shape market shares and a firm’s information strategy. His work has also appeared in the Journal of Economic Theory, Games and Economic Behavior and Electronic Journal of Statistics. He is an Associate Editor of Mathematical Social Sciences. At SKK GSB, he teaches Operations Management and Management Science and Decision Analytics, serves as Faculty Chair of the AI MBA, a program customized for Incheon International Airport Corporation (IIAC), and received the Teaching Excellence Award in 2024, 2025, and 2026.


 

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Publications
  • Huettner, F., & Sunder, M. (2012). Axiomatic arguments for decomposing goodness of fit according to Shapley and Owen values. Electronic Journal of Statistics, 6, 1239–1250.
  • Casajus, A., & Huettner, F. (2013). Null players, solidarity, and the egalitarian Shapley values. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 49(1), 58–61.
  • Casajus, A., & Huettner, F. (2014a). Null, nullifying, or dummifying players: The difference between the Shapley value, the equal division value, and the equal surplus division value. Economics Letters, 122(2), 167–169.
  • Casajus, A., & Huettner, F. (2014b). On a class of solidarity values. European Journal of Operational Research, 236(2), 583–591.
  • Béal, S., Casajus, A., Huettner, F., Rémila, E., & Solal, P. (2014). Solidarity within a fixed community. Economics Letters, 125(3), 440–443.
  • Casajus, A., & Huettner, F. (2014c). Weakly monotonic solutions for cooperative games. Journal of Economic Theory, 154, 162–172.
  • Huettner, F. (2015a). A proportional value for cooperative games with a coalitional structure. Theory and Decision, 78(2), 273–287.
  • Béal, S., Casajus, A., & Huettner, F. (2015). Efficient extensions of the Myerson value. Social Choice and Welfare, 45(4), 819–827.
  • Casajus, A., & Huettner, F. (2015b). Potential, value, and the multilinear extension. Economics Letters, 135, 28–30.
  • Béal, S., Casajus, A., & Huettner, F. (2016a). On the existence of efficient and fair extensions of communication values for connected graphs. Economics Letters, 146, 103–106.
  • Béal, S., Casajus, A., Huettner, F., Rémila, E., & Solal, P. (2016b). Characterizations of weighted and equal division values. Theory and Decision, 80(4), 649–667.
  • Huettner, F., & Wiese, H. (2016c). The need for permission, the power to enforce, and duality in cooperative games with a hierarchy. International Game Theory Review, 18(4), 1650015.
  • Béal, S., Casajus, A., & Huettner, F. (2018a). Efficient extensions of communication values. Annals of Operations Research, 264(1–2), 41–56.
  • Casajus, A., & Huettner, F. (2018b). Calculating direct and indirect contributions of players in cooperative games via the multi-linear extension. Economics Letters, 164, 27–30.
  • Casajus, A., & Huettner, F. (2018c). Decomposition of solutions and the Shapley value. Games and Economic Behavior, 108, 37–48.
  • Casajus, A., & Huettner, F. (2019a). The Coleman-Shapley index: Being decisive within the coalition of the interested. Public Choice, 181, 275–289.
  • Huettner, F., Boyacı, T., & Akçay, Y. (2019b). Consumer choice under limited attention when alternatives have different information costs Operations Research, 67(3), 671–699.
  • Basteck, C., & Huettner, F. (2023a). Coalitional manipulations and immunity of the Shapley value. arXiv.
  • Huettner, F., & Karos, D. (2023b). Liability situations with successive tortfeasors. In Advances in collective decision making: Interdisciplinary perspectives for the 21st century (pp. 191–204).
  • Casajus, A., & Huettner, F. (2024a). Random partitions, potential, value, and externalities. Games and Economic Behavior, 147, 88–106.
  • Huettner, F., Boyacı, T., & Akçay, Y. (2024b). Erratum to “Consumer choice under limited attention when alternatives have different information costs.” Operations Research, 72(4), 1536–1538.
  • Casajus, A., Funaki, Y., & Huettner, F. (2026). Balanced contributions, consistency, and value for games with externalities. European Journal of Operational Research, 330(1), 343–352.
Research Summary
[Decision Sciences] Frank Huettner - Balanced contributions, consistency, and value for games with externalities
Abstract<br /> <br /> We consider fair and consistent extensions of the Shapley value for games with externalities. Based on the restriction identified by Casajus et al. (2024, Games Econ. Behavior 147, 88-146), we define balanced contributions, Sobolev s consistency, and Hart and Mas-Colell s consistency for games with externalities, and we show that these properties lead to characterizations of the generalization of the Shapley value introduced by Macho-Stadler et al. (2007, J. Econ. Theory 135, 339-356), that parallel important characterizations of the Shapley value.
Keywords

Shapley value , partition function form , random partition , restriction operator

Details (→)

[Decision Sciences] Frank Huettner - Random partitions, potential, value, and externalities
Professor Frank Huettner of Sungkyunkwan University&rsquo;s SKK GSB has published a paper in the prestigious journal Games and Economic Behavior on a method for plausibly distributing benefits, even when outsiders can exert externalities. Professor Huettner, along with Professor Andr&eacute; Casajus of HHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management and Professor Yukihiko Funaki of Waseda University, conducted research on the Shapley value and its extensions.<br /> <br /> <br /> <br /> Abstract<br /> <br /> The Shapley value equals a player&#39;s contribution to the potential of a game. The potential is a most natural one-number summary of a game, which can be computed as the expected accumulated worth of a random partition of the players. This computation integrates the coalition formation of all players and readily extends to games with externalities. We investigate those potential functions for games with externalities that can be computed this way. It turns out that the potential that corresponds to the MPW solution introduced by Macho-Stadler et al. (2007, J. Econ. Theory 135, 339&ndash;356) is unique in the following sense. It is obtained as the expected accumulated worth of a random partition, it generalizes the potential for games without externalities, and it induces a solution that satisfies the null player property even in the presence of externalities.
Keywords

player contribution , game summary , externalities , subgames

Details (→)

Awards & Honors

  • 2024 SKK GSB Professional MBA Program Teaching Excellence Award

  • 2025 SKK GSB Business Analytics MBA Program Teaching Excellence Award

  • 2026 SKK GSB Professional MBA Program Teaching Excellence Award

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